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power to review the administration,
curricula, and faculty of the Army War
College with an eye toward ensuring
that the institution is able to address
contemporary issues effectively and is
positioned to adapt and change.
Stiehm organizes her conclusions and
recommendations around the three
thematic issues of “training and education,” “civil-military relations,” and
“war and peace.” The first deals with
the basic function of the institution.
Carlisle’s mission statement is focused
on the preparation and education of selected military, civilian, and international leaders. Is the mission of Carlisle
to train or to educate? The differences
are not subtle. Stiehm argues that the
nature and composition of the faculty,
design of the curriculum, and manner
of course presentation all lead one to
conclude that Carlisle is a training institution, not optimized for education,
and that if the mission of Carlisle is in
fact education, significant changes are
required.
The second deals with the most basic
constitutional issue of civilian control
of the military. Stiehm concludes that
the Army War College does not adequately prepare future senior leaders
for the complications of realpolitik. She
posits that there is an erosion of civilian
control of the military and that this erosion is partially the result of the failure
by the senior service colleges to ensure
that graduates appreciate the unique
position of the military, as it relates to
government officials elected by the
citizenry.
The third issue deals with the notion
that we preserve the peace by preparing
for war. Stiehm concludes that the
Army War College may be spending too
much time preparing for the wrong war
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and is unresponsive to today’s security
environment. She argues that the college could become a powerful change
agent for military strategy, structure,
and procurement, if certain of her recommendations were adopted. Among
her recommendations are increased hiring of civilian Ph.D.s rather than retired
military officers with doctorates, who,
according to Stiehm, are of limited utility; increased independent research by
the faculty; redesign of the curriculum
to create “discomfort” (that is, to cause
students to think outside of their comfort zones); and offer master’s degrees
to only a limited number of students.
Stiehm provides much grist for the intellectual mill and does the Army War
College a service by creating a framework for professional dialogue and offering recommendations for future
improvements.
BILL BROWN

Colonel, U.S. Army

de Montbrial, Thierry and Jean Klein, eds.
Dictionnaire de Stratégie. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000. 604pp. $130.92

At a moment when American and
French perceptions of security threats
and appropriate policy responses in the
Middle East are in apparent collision, it
is well to be reminded how little Americans in the defense intellectual community know of their French counterparts.
Yet as this volume shows, strategic studies in France are not only alive and well
but well informed, intellectually sophisticated, and surprisingly free of
anti-American animus.
Thierry de Montbrial, director of the
prestigious French Institute of
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International Relations (IFRI), and Jean
Klein, a professor at the Sorbonne, have
assembled a wide-ranging collection of
articles emphasizing the historical and
theoretical dimensions of strategy,
though without neglecting such current
topics as terrorism, the Yugoslav crisis,
NATO, or the revolution in military affairs. There are substantial pieces on
various national schools of strategic
theorizing, beginning with the ancient
Greeks, Romans, and Chinese, and ending with the Soviets and the “AngloSaxons.” Carl von Clausewitz is given
due deference throughout, but the book
also broadly acknowledges the reality of
“culture” in shaping strategic rationality. There is a good general article on
“strategic culture,” as well as useful separate essays on Chinese and Asiatic strategic culture by Valérie Niquet, author
of a treatise on Chinese strategy (Les
fondements de la stratégie chinoise, Paris,
1997) that ought to be more widely
known on this side of the Atlantic.
Great commanders (even Napoleon)
are given short shrift by the editors except as contributors to the development
of the art of war, but there are individual articles on strategic thinkers both
minor and major. From the AngloSaxon world, Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Julian Corbett, J. F. C. Fuller, T. E.
Lawrence, Liddell Hart, Bernard
Brodie, and Herbert Rosinski make up
what is perhaps not an obvious selection. (Particularly interesting is the appreciation of Rosinski, a German
refugee who, while on the faculty of the
Naval War College, produced notable
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yet today almost completely neglected
works on the historical development of
strategy and on naval strategy.) From
the French tradition, there are the standard figures—Antoine Henri Jomini,
Ardant du Picq, Ferdinand Foch,
Charles de Gaulle, Raymond Aron,
Raoul Castex (the foremost French naval theorist), André Beaufre, Pierre
Gallois, and others; there are also obscure yet interesting names, like
Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy (1719–
80), who apparently introduced the term
“strategy” in reference to the higher
component of the art of war, and the
contemporary strategist Lucien Poirier.
Montbrial’s own substantial essay on
the theory of strategy deserves particular attention. Montbrial distinguishes
his own view from that of certain of the
other contributors, defining strategy in
a broad sense to encompass aspects that
transcend the art of war as such. He is
well versed in game theory and the
American business strategy literature,
yet, unusually, reserves a place for
“glory” in the strategic calculus. Of the
other contributors, mention should
also be made of Hervé Coutau-Bégarie,
author of a Traité de stratégie (Paris,
1999) as well as a number of works on
naval history and strategy, and François
Géré, who has produced studies of
American strategy and military policy
and of psychological warfare. It is to be
hoped that this material will not forever
remain untranslated.
CARNES LORD

Naval War College
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